BIO/00/32, Brussels 18/02/2000 - Returning from her fact finding mission on cyanide pollution in Romania and Hungary, European Commissioner Margot Wallström declared:
"We have decided to create an international task force immediately to provide an independant assessment of this major environmental accident. The authorities and the local communities affected need all the help we can provide, together with local and international organisations, in analysing this accident, as well as the damages and the needs for assistance.

She added:

There are many lessons to be learned to prevent this sort of accident from happening again in Europe in the future. The Baia Mare accident, like the previous similar accident in Doñana and the recent ERIKA disaster in France, has demonstrated that we need to further tighten European legislation. We must ensure that polluters can effectively be held responsible for damages. We will also need to strengthen our civil protection capabilities."

Mrs. Wallström met with the Hungarian Foreign Minister, the Hungarian and Romanian Environment Ministers, local authorities, NGOs and citizens, as well as a representative from the company Aurul SA, from which the cyanide spill originated. She visited polluted sites in both countries.

She announced that the following seven steps will be taken:

1. Creation of an international task force chaired by the European Commission
2. Immediate technical assistance to Hungarian and Romanian authorities
3. Evaluation of needs for financial assistance based on assessments of the damage and formulation of restoration projects
4. Reinforcement of the EU's civil protection capabilities
5. Extension of the ongoing Commission study on environmental hotspots in the mining industry to include the candidate countries
6. Review and adaptation of existing EU legislation
7. Acceleration of preparations of legislation on environmental liability

Civil society will be invited to participate in the work, and the general public will be fully informed about the task force's findings.

Technical experts will go to Hungary and Romania to assist local experts in information and preventive action already undertaken by the authorities of the two countries.

The Commission intends to make funds available for assessment of the damages. Also, funding under the PHARE programme, and possibly other existing programmes or funds, will be envisaged.

The Commission will immediately start exploring how already existing Civil Protection networks and resources could be reinforced, to be better prepared to react to environmental accidents and disasters in the future.

The study on the mining industry will be completed by the end of this year.

Existing legislation, notably on industrial accidents, should be reviewed to cover risks relating to the mining industry.

Following adoption of the White Paper on enviromental liability on 9 February, preparation of a proposal for a Framework Directive should be speeded up to secure rapid introduction of a strict liabilty regime for environmental damage, based on the 'polluter pays' principle.

Baia Mare cyanide spill Help-line:
Telephone: +32 2 299 66 60
E-mail: env-danubetf@cec.eu.int

Brussels 14/03/2000 - The Baia Mare Task Force, set up by Commissioner Wallström following her visit to the site of the cyanide spill in Romania held its first meeting in Brussels today in the offices of the European Commission.
In opening the meeting, Commissioner Wallström declared: "Since my visit to the site of the serious accident in Baia Mare I am pleased to see that thing are moving rapidly and that concrete actions are taking place. The latest incident in Baia Borsa has underlined the great importance and urgency of the work of this Task Force. It also demonstrates the need to strengthen our capabilities for civil protection "

She added: "The make-up of the Task Force reflects the great concern about environmental pollution across the spectrum, from civil society to governmental institutions. I am sure that each member of the Task Force will contribute to the maximum in fulfilling its mission and will come to conclusions by the end of this year. The Task Force must ensure that the public is well informed about its work"

At the meeting the Task Force agreed on the practical implications of its remit:

Establish what happened and apportion the causes of the spill as precisely as possible.

Assess the damage and propose actions to remedy the negative impacts. It will take a longer-term view on what needs to be done to restore ecological balance to the effected areas. It cannot become involved in any consideration of 'compensation' as such.

Keep the public informed through a two way process of communication, working through established and recognised NGOs.

Identify other 'hot-spots' in the mining and extractive industries.

Make suggestions to reduce further risks and if necessary recommend whether (in the opinion of the members of the Task Force) the existing regulatory framework is adequate.

The Task Force also agreed on an outline plan for future work and timetable:

A United Nations report giving results of their on-site assessment will be studied by the Task Force after its publication in early April. This meeting is scheduled for the 17 April.

This will be followed up by discussions with representatives of civil society and governments.

The final report from the Task Force will be made public on completion by the end of the year.

The Chairman, Tom Garvey, announced that he would visit the scene of the accident on 27/28 March, meet with the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) later that same week and visit Hungary on 31 March.

The secretariat of the Task Force will be established shortly in Vienna. In the meantime as a temporary facility an e-mail address (env-danubetf@cec.eu.int) and hotline (+32.2.299.66.60) have been set up. Other information relating to the Task Force can be found on the DG ENV web page at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enlarg/home.htm

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 23.10.2000 - COM(2000) 664 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION

1. INTRODUCTION

The Danube pollution caused by a cyanide spill following a damburst of a tailings pond in Baia Mare/Romania and an accident that occurred in 1998 in Aznalcóllar/Spain where a damburst poisoned the environment of the Coto Doñana National Park have increased public awareness of the environmental and safety hazards of mining activities.

The Baia Mare accident showed that in the region surrounding the operation in question, the level of public knowledge and understanding of risks inherent in mining and related industrial processes was very low. It also showed that there was insufficient communication between the various levels of authorities and between the authorities, the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the public concerning emergency preparedness, emergency response and damage prevention options and possibilities.

The accidents have also raised the question of the effectiveness of Community policies intended to prevent such disasters and have highlighted the need for a review of environmental policy in this area.

The Commission has already laid down its policy towards promoting sustainable development in the EU non-energy extractive industry, including metal mining, in its Communication of 3 May 2000 ¹ . The objective of this Communication, which should be seen in this context, is to give an account of the accidents and to inform the Council and the European Parliament in more detail about some of the actions announced in the previous Communication, focussing on accident prevention in relation to metal mining activities. The objective is also to provide an opportunity for the principal stakeholders concerned, notably industry, NGOs, Member States and other interested parties, to give their views on these actions. The Communication was established in close consultation with the Baia Mare Task Force (see section 3.1.). For factual elements concerning the Baia Mare accident, the paper relies to a large extent on the UNEP/OCHA report ² , published in March 2000 (see section 3.2.).

2. OVERVIEW OF MINING ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DAMBURSTS WORLDWIDE

In the past ten years, a number of mining accidents have happened world-wide. In 1992, a damburst at the Summitville Gold Mine in Colorado/USA caused the complete loss of aquatic life along a 25 km stretch of the Alamosa river. In 1993, masses of sludge and rubble buried a gold miner's settlement in Ecuador causing the death of 24 people. In 1994, a similar accident at the Harmony Gold Mine in South Africa killed 17 people and destroyed 80 houses. In 1995, 2,5 million cubic meters of cyanide solution from the Omai Gold Mine in Guyana contaminated the river Essequibo causing massive loss of aquatic life. In 1996, on Marinduque Island on the Phillippines, 3 million tonnes of poisonous sludge from a copper mine flowed into the river Boac flooding 20 villages.

While the accidents described above happened outside Europe, two more recent mining accidents in Europe have raised the question of the safe operation of mining activities in the EU Member States and in the candidate countries for accession to the European Union, together with the adequacy of relevant Community legislation in this area.

2.1. The "Aznalcóllar" accident³

The accident occurred on 25 April 1998 in the installation of Boliden-Apirsa which exploited a mine at Aznalcóllar, Boliden-Apirsa had acquired the mine in 1987, while the mine had been in exploitation for a considerable number of years already.

The mine produces zinc-, silver-, lead- and copper-concentrates from a pyritical ore body. The pyritical ore, which also contains arsenic, cadmium, thallium and other metals in lower concentrations, is broken in the mine installations and milled down to a rather fine grain. Then, different metal compounds are separated from this fine-grained ore with the help of a flotation process, where water is used, to which sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ) calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)2 ), copper sulphate pentahydrate and an organic compound are added as agents, in order to promote flotation.

At the time of the accident, the tailings (the waste resulting from the above process) was discharged into an artificial pond (tailing pond), a common method for managing and disposing of this type of waste. The pond covered a surface of about 1.5 km 2 and contained, at the time of the accident, about 31 millions tons of sludge. Around this pond, a dam had been erected to contain the tailings; the dam was regularly increased, as more quantities of tailings were added. The main material that was used for the construction of the dam came from the mining activity itself.

In the night between 24 and 25 April 1998, the dam around the pond broke at a length of about 50m. Some three million m 3 of sludge and four million m 3 of acidic waters were discharged into the adjacent environment, where about 4.500 hectares of land on the border of the Coto Doñana National Park were polluted, and into the river Guadiamar. The major part of the sludge remained in the neighbourhood of the pond, where layers of sludge with a thickness up to two meters were found, the thickness decreased progressively with large parts of the affected land being covered with a layer of about 20 cm, but diminishing down to some millimetres. No damage to humans occurred. The question of whether the accident was foreseeable, and therefore preventable, is still subject to investigation.

Local, provincial and regional authorities and the operator of the mine undertook emergency work to contain the sludges and waters, in particular in order to protect the natural reserve of Coto Doñana. Clean-up work continued during most of 1998 with additional re-cleaning of some areas in 1999. The sludge and contaminated soil were brought and disposed of in the old pit of the mine of Aznalcóllar in the north of the tailing pond. The tailings pond is currently undergoing decommissioning. Following authorisation from the regional government of Andalusia, the mining operation restarted in 1999, temporarily using the old pit of Aznalcóllar for tailings disposal.

2.2. The "Baia Mare" accident

On 30 January 2000, a dam at the Aurul smelter of the "Baia Mare" goldmine at Sasar/Romania broke. An estimated 100,000 m3 of mud and wastewater with a 126 mg/litre cyanide load entered through de-watering channels into the Lapus River, a tributary to the Somes (Szamos) river and from there into the Tisza river and the Danube upstream of Belgrade and finally entered the Black Sea. The acute transboundary pollution had the potential of having a severe negative impact on biodiversity, the rivers' ecosystems, drinking water supply and socio-economic conditions of the local population.

Romania, Hungary and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia performed sampling and analyses. Measurements on 1 February 2000 at Satu Mare on the Somes showed a maximum concentration of cyanides reported to be 7.8 mg/litre (compare with maximum limit value for surface waters of 0.01 mg/litre). A 30-40 kilometre long contaminated wave wiped out flora and the fauna of the central Tisza River with damages estimated of hundreds of thousands of € . The cyanide plume was measurable at the Danube delta, four weeks later and 2000 km from the spill source.

Acute effects, typical for cyanide, occurred for long stretches of the river system down to the confluence of the Tisza with the Danube: phyto- and zooplankton were down to zero when the cyanide plume passed and fish were killed in the plume or immediately after. The Hungarian authorities provided estimates of the total amount of fish killed in excess of one thousand tons, whereas the Romanian authorities reported that the amount of dead fish reported was very small. According to the Yugoslavian authorities a large amount of dead fish appeared in the Yugoslavian part of the Tisza river. No major fish kills were reported from the Danube. Soon after the cyanide plume passed, the aquatic micro-organisms recovered rapidly. Long-term effects on bio-diversity will have to be shown from further analysis. Environmental experts fear that some rare and unique species both of flora and of fauna have been endangered, e.g. the five ospreys living in the Hortobagy National park in Hungary. It is difficult to assess the exact damage caused by the accident as the river had been subject to long-term chronic pollution from the mining activities in the region.

Timely information exchange and precautionary measures taken by the Romanian, Hungarian and Yugoslavian authorities, including a temporary closure of the Tisza lake dam, mitigated and reduced the risk and impact of the spill. The water supply of the two largest cities along the Tisza River, Szolnok (120,000 inhabitants) and Szeged (206,000 inhabitants) was not endangered due to the prompt action of the local authorit ies.

Villages close to the accident site were provided with alternative water sources, but were allegedly not informed about the spill sufficiently early. Downstream drinking water was not affected because of the use of alternative supplies and deep wells. Consequently, immediate human health risk seems to be minimal from this spill alone, but chronic health impacts due to long-term pollution by heavy metals are possible.

The spill occurred in an area already contaminated with heavy metals from a long history of mining and metal processing. Upstream locations unaffected by this particular spill also contained high levels of some heavy metals. Thus, the accident occurred in a region with a number of poorly maintained and operated plants and flotation ponds containing cyanide and/or heavy metals, many of which are leaking continuously. There is a risk of further pollution of surface and groundwater as well as soils due to continued leaking or acute accidents.

3. IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

Following a preliminary assessment of the consequences of the "Baia Mare" accident, the following steps were considered necessary to address the continuing risks of pollution from mining activities:

• Creation of an international Task Force chaired by the European Commission
• Immediate technical assistance to Hungarian and Romanian authorities
• Evaluation of needs for financial assistance based on assessments of the damage and formulation of restoration projects
• Reinforcement of the EU's civil protection capabilities
• Extension of the ongoing Commission study on environmental hotspots in the mining industry to include the candidate countries
• Review and possible adaptation of existing EU legislation
• Acceleration of preparations of legislation on environmental liability.

Furthermore, the Commission at present is collecting information from the EU Member States as well as from the candidate countries for accession to the European Union on the number, location and capacity of installations performing the mineral processing of sulphide ores and the mineral processing of ores containing gold using the cyanide process. It is particularly interesting to investigate whether tailings ponds used in these installations are properly managed or if they pose environmental risks, through chronic pollution and/or through a high risk of failure.

3.1. The "Baia Mare" Task Force

This Task Force is led by a representative nominated by the European Commission. Its six members are high level officials from the EU Commission and international, regional and national bodies for protection of the environment. The secretariat of the TaskForce isinVienna,onthepremisesofthe Commission forthe Protectionofthe Danube River.

The mission of the Task Force is to establish what happened, assess the damage and propose actions to remedy the negative impacts. It will also propose actions to keep the general public fully informed about the situation. To prevent any similar accident to happen in the future the Task Force will identify potential hotspots in the Danube river basin and make suggestions to reduce risks.

The Task Force held its first meeting in March 2000 in Brussels in the offices of the European Commission. At the meeting the Task Force agreed on the practical implicat ions of its remit:

• Establish what happened and apportion the causes of the spill as precisely as possible.
  
  
• Assess the damage and propose actions to remedy the negative impacts. It will take a longer-term view on what needs to be done to restore ecological balance to the effected areas. It cannot become involved in any consideration of 'compensation' as such.
  
  
• Keep the public informed through a two way process of communication, working through established and recognised Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
  
  
• Identify other 'hot-spots' in the mining and extractive industries.
  
  
• Make suggestions to reduce further risks and, if necessary recommend whether (in the opinion of the members of the Task Force) the existing regulatory framework is adequate.

The final report from the Task Force will be made public on completion by the end of the year 2000. European metal mining industry has offered to assist the Task Force.

3.2.The UNEP/OCHA Report on the Cyanide Spill at Baia Mare/Romania

Following requests from the Governments of Hungary, Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and consultations with the European Commission and the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) announced on 18 February 2000 that a team of international experts would be sent to the affected area to carry out a scientific analysis of the environmental damage caused by the spill.

The mission was a joint venture of UNEP and OCHA, organized by the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit, and headed by the Director of UNEP's Regional Office for Europe. Its terms of reference included an independent, scientific description of the spill, the situation and events causing it, the collection and review of data related to the spill and its environmental implications, and the preparation of recommendations for future action and prevention.

The mission represented a useful model for inter-agency cooperation and multi-disciplinary rapid assessment work. It was limited in size, scope and time, and consequently not intended to provide a full overview of the emergency and its implications. It mainly represented environmental input to a process of international investigation and reviews by, inter alia, the Baia Mare Task Force.

The mission, which lasted from 23 February to 6 March 2000, combined sampling, analysis, interviews with relevant national and local experts, discussions with national authorities, affected populations and local Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

Experts from seven countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) were selected at very short notice to travel to the affected areas. The range of expertise included in the team covered chemistry, eco-toxicology, biology, process engineering and dam engineering.

The team assembled in Bucharest in Romania, then traveled to the breach site in Baia Mare before crossing the border into Hungary and followed the river system down to the FRY border. Finally, sampling was undertaken along the Danube in the FRY. The mission divided into seven key areas of investigation:

• Dam site construction and management to understand how the breach occurred
• Emergency planning and early warning systems
• Drinking water implications for communities potentially affected by contamination of groundwater wells and public drinking water supplies
• Surface water quality including chemical, biological and eco-toxicological impacts
• Sediment and soil impacts, especially with regard to heavy metal releases
• Sampling and analytical methods employed by different local and national authorities to examine potential discrepancies in the measurement of contamination
• Interviews and contacts with local authorities, NGOs and representatives of the population to assess the social and economic context and implications of the spill.

4. THE "BAIA MARE" ACCIDENT FROM A TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW - PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNT

This chapter contains descriptions of the company and its project. Without prejudging the results of the Baia Mare Task Force, it ident ifies the most probable reasons for the cyanide spill and possible lessons to be learnt from the accident.

4.1.1. Company Description

The Company that operated the processing plant for exhausted mining tailings in Baia Mare, Romania, is called Aurul S.A. It is a joint stock company mainly owned by Esmeralda Exploration Limited of Australia (50%) and by Remin (Romanian State owned)(44.8%). Esmeralda is a small company operating only this plant in Baia Mare. Following the accident Esmeralda has been put into administration.

4.1.2. Project description

Previous production of ores in the Baia Mare area by Remin had left behind large quantities of tailings with a low content of gold and silver. These dams restricted further urban development of the city and were also a cause of serious environmental problems. The tailings heaps were located in the middle of the city and polluted surface and groundwater as well as causing drifting dust - in particular in the summer months. The project was therefore set up to clean up the sites, following an international tender; after the development of new processing technologies, the re-processing of these tailings had become technically and economically feasible.

The "Baia Mare Tailings Retreatment Project" was designed to process 2,500,000 t.p.a. of tailings from old mining activities. To make it available for the gold leaching process it was sprayed with water jets, so that the slurry could be pumped to a thickener. From there, the slurry went to a ball mill, mostly in order to polish the surface so that cyanidation would be more effective. The fine slurry of ore and water then entered the so-called Carbon-in-Pulp (CIP) plant.

The residues from the CIP process were pumped from the plant to the tailings dam located approximately 7 kilometres south of Baia Mare in the area of Sasar village. Before starting the operation, a new 96 ha tailings pond was constructed with earth dams and a plastic liner. The construction consisted of an inner embankment and a lower outer embankment. The outer embankment was not intended to catch water from a spill, but rather to collect leachate and rain water running off the inner embankment.

As soon as operations started, the coarser fractions of tailings were used to continue construction of the dam. For that reason, a series of hydrocyclones spaced along the top of the tailings dam was used. The finer fraction, together with the water used, was discharged into the pond behind the dam. After the slurry had settled, the decanted water was recycled back into the leaching process, to minimise the total use of cyanide in the process.

Figure 1. Cross section of the tailings pond

To summarise, the tailings pond in some respects performed a similar role as a mining heap or a landfill, where the ground ore is disposed of. After the tailings pond had reached its final shape and volume, the remaining water would be pumped away or evaporate.

4.1.3. Circumstances of the spill

After extreme weather conditions (ice and snow on the tailing pond, high precipitat ion - 36 l/m 2 ), the tailings deposited on the inner embankment became soaked. Stability was affected, causing local displacement and this subsequently developed into breach of approximately 23 m. The water released through the breach filled the area between the two embankments and spilled over the outer embankment.

4.1.4. Lessons to be learnt from the accident

It should be noted that the use of cyanide is currently the preferred method, for environmental as well as for economical reasons, for processing gold containing ores and is common practice around the world. The design and management of tailings ponds, be it in relation to gold mining or other extractive activities, is highly dependent on site-specific conditions. This may include the terrain and the mineralogy where the pond can be constructed, the type of waste, and the climatic conditions.

Aurul S.A. recycled the cyanide-bearing water in a "closed cycle". Aurul S.A. decided to opt for the "closed cycle" to save costs on neutralisation chemicals and cyanide. As a result, the tailings pond constituted a risk, in so far as it continuously contained high levels of cyanide. Romanian experts estimated that about 120 tonnes of cyanide were spilled intothe river.

When operating tailing ponds after the processing of gold-bearing ore with the cyanide process, the cyanide can be destroyed with, for example, sodium hypo-chlorite before pumping the water with the residues into the tailings pond. After sedimentation, the water is either discharged or pumped back into the process and mixed with cyanide again. The most obvious measure to prevent accidents in case of excess water in the pond is to ensure that the dam is well engineered and constructed of appropriate material to withstand the foreseeable load. The provision of back-up containment is a secondary measure to reduce the impact on the environment in the event of a dam break and where the pond liquor is more hazardous, for example where no treatment of the cyanide takes place, the consequences of a spill are greater thus justifying such further measures.

Additional storage capacity could be achieved by constructing additional dams to catch any spilled water. Other measures include the possibility to discharge extra water from the pond in order to lower the water level in the pond in case of a sudden rise of the water level due to high precipitation. Furthermore, the management and continuous build-up of the tailings pond requires careful attention, especially as regards the balance between solids and water in the dam and how this balance is affected by, for example, heavy precipitation. This involves closely monitoring the size of the "beach" (i.e. the area from the top of the inner embankment to the water line; see Figure 1.) as well as of the "freeboard" (i.e. the difference between the top of the dam and the water level; see Figure 1.). In addition, the accident is also a reminder that the design and management of a tailings pond must take into account the worst foreseeable weather conditions, such as heavy rain or snow, as well as how the operation of the pond is affected by temperatures below zero. These proposals give an idea as to what could be done when designing and operating tailings ponds of this type to minimise the risks of an accident.

Finally, a key issue highlighted by the accident has been the influence of ineffective permitting and enforcement procedures and capabilities in creating the circumstances in which dams with design flaws could have been constructed and given permit authorisation. According to the UNEP/OCHA report, the plant had received 22 individual environmental and public health permits before operations were allowed to start. These permits took a total of seven years to obtain. In Romania, it remains a problem today that there is no effective overall co-ordination between the many different bodies involved in permitting and that a single organisation can oversee overall regulatory and technical aspects. There is great concern that other existing facilities in the accession countries, in a wide range of industries, may have received inadequate regulatory control and may currently pose environment and health threats. As a result, the need to improve permitting procedures and also to enhance the resources and capabilities of the regulatory agencies involved will require additional consideration.

5. CURRENT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO EXISTING COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION

There are a number of existing Community legal instruments which address the environmental aspects of mining activities.

5.1. Council Directive 85/337/EEC⁴as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC⁵on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment and the UNECE Espoo-Convention on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment⁶

Council Directive 85/337/EEC as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC, the so-called EIA Directive, requires an environmental impact assessment of a large number of economic activities, including mining activities and dams in case such activities are likely to have significant impacts on the environment.

The EIA Directive puts emphasis on the preventive approach since it requires an assessment of the likely environmental effects of activities before authorisation is given. Such assessment shall be reflected in an environmental report that has to be taken into account by the competent authority granting authorisation. Envisaged mitigation measures form part of such assessment. An important factor in the impact assessment procedure is the involvement and participation of the public within the given regulations. The resulting comments have to be carefully considered by the competent authority. Such a participatory approach ensures transparency, early involvement and information of the public and helps identifying and mitigating risks for the environment.

The EIA Directive also implements the UNECE Espoo-Convention on transboundary impact assessment. This Convention was signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1997. Currently, there are 30 Parties to the Convention, including the European Community. Mining activities and dams are also listed in this Convention. In case of the likelihood of a significant transboundary environmental impact of a planned project, the affected Parties have to be notified and all relevant information on the project including the environmental report has to be submitted so that the public liable to be affected gets the opportunity to comment. The results of such transboundary consultation have to be taken into account by the competent authority of the Party that is responsible for granting authorisation to the project.

5.2. Council Directive 76/464/EEC on pollution caused by certain dangerous substances discharged into the aquatic environment of the Community⁷

Pollution caused by discharge of dangerous substances to the aquatic environment is covered by this Directive. However, it does not address accidental pollution. 18 substances including cadmium and mercury were regulated in five 'Daughter' Directives by setting Community-wide emission limit values and quality standards for the aquatic environment. For relevant pollutants, which have to be identified out of a wide range of other substances including cyanides and heavy metals, the Member States must establish national emission reduction programmes. The programmes must include legally binding water quality objectives and deadlines for implementation of certain emission reduction targets. In relation to mining activities there is a considerable pollution potential from certain dangerous substances which may cause a deleterious effect on the aquatic environment. The identification of such a pollution leads to a requirement of authorisation of discharges containing the relevant pollutants. Hence, an effective pollution control of point sources from mining would be possible under the Directive.

5.3. Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (Seveso II Directive)8 and UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents⁹

The Directive aims at the prevention of major accidents which involve dangerous substances and the limitation of their consequences for man and the environment, with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout the Community in a consistent and effective manner.

The core novelty of Seveso II consists in the introduction of an obligation for industrial operators to put into effect Safety Management Systems including a detailed risk assessment using possible accident scenarios. Such a risk assessment plays a key role in preventing major accidents.

The classical field of application of Seveso II are chemical plants and storage facilities where dangerous substances are present in quantities above certain threshold levels.

Article 4 e) of the Directive excludesthe activities of the extractive industries concerned with exploration for, and the exploitation of, minerals in mines and quarries or by means of boreholes from its scope. Moreover, Article 4 f) excludes waste land-fill sites.

These exclusions go back to the original Seveso Directive of 1982 that excluded extraction or other mining operations as well as installations for the disposal of toxic and dangerous waste which are covered by Community Acts in so far as the purpose of those Acts is the prevention of major accidents.

When the Proposal for Seveso II was presented to Council and European Parliament, the Explanatory Memorandum justified maintaining the above exclusions by saying that "although these areas present a major accident potential, they do not fall easily within the framework of the proposal given special needs or special hazards."

The Seveso II Directive leaves some margin for interpretation of its coverage that could be used to exclude processing activities and/or tailing ponds or dams from its scope

The Directive also implements the UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. This Convention was signed in 1992 and entered into force in April 2000. Currently, there are 17 Parties to the Convention, including the European Community. The Convention aims at protecting human beings and the environment against industrial accidents capable of causing transboundary effects and at promoting active international co-operation between the Contracting Parties before, during and after such accidents. However, the Convention does not apply to dam failures, with the exception of the effects of industrial accidents caused by such failures.

5.4. Community Waste management legislation

5.4.1. Directive 75/442/EEC¹⁰as amended by Directive 91/156/EEC¹¹on waste

Article 2 of Directive 75/442/EEC on waste as amended by Directive 91/156/EEC establishes that waste resulting from prospecting, extraction, treatment and storage of mineral resources and the working of quarries shall be excluded from the scope of Directive 75/442/EEC where they are already covered by other Community legislation. At present there is no specific Community legislation on this type of waste. Therefore, Directive 75/442/EEC applies to waste from the extractive industry.

Article 4 of Directive 75/442/EEC establishes that Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that waste is recovered or disposed of without endangering human heath and without using processes or methods which could harm the environment.

5.4.2. Directive 99/31/EC on the landfill of waste¹²

The deposit of waste in a pond is a waste disposal operation covered by existing EU legislation - Directive 99/31/EC on the landfill of waste. This Directive 99/31/EC came into force on 16 July 1999 and will be effective by 16 July 2001.

According to this Directive, the deposit of non-hazardous inert waste resulting from prospecting and extraction, treatment, and storage of mineral resources as from the operation of quarries is excluded from the scope of the Directive. However, waste from metal mining is generally not an inert waste. Thus, the Directive would apply. The Directive lays down requirements concerning the authorisation of landfills, the technical construction of landfills, the types of waste acceptable at landfills and the monitoring procedures for landfills.

Although the Directive is not yet applicable, there are a number of requirements which are relevant to waste management in relation to mining activities.

- The location of the landfill must take into consideration inter alia the distance from groundwater or superficial water and the risk of flooding, subsidence, landslides or avalanches.

- Appropriate measures must be taken to control water from precipitation and prevent it from entering into the landfill body.

- The emplacement of waste on the site must be done in such a way to ensure the stability of the waste and the associated structures, particularly to avoid slippages.

- A monitoring programme for the control of water, leachate and gas is laid down. The monitoring results must be reported to the competent authorities.

It should be noted that the Landfill Directive was adopted primarily to regulate the disposal of waste into normal landfill sites. All the issues related to tailing ponds management have not been specifically considered in this Directive.

5.5. Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC Directive)¹³

All installations covered by Annex I of the IPPC Directive are required to obtain an operating permit from the competent authorities in the Member States. For "everyday pollution", permits must contain emission limit values or equivalent parameters. These shall be based on the use of Best Available Techniques (BAT). In addition, permits must include provisions that deal with other conditions than normal operating conditions, relating to start-up, leaks malfunctions, momentary stoppages and definitive cessation of operations, where there is a risk that the environment may be affected.

The IPPC Directive covers the overall environmental impact of the production process, i.e. air, water and soil pollution, generation of process residues, use of energy, etc. The focus shall be on prevention rather than "end-of-pipe" abatement. In the Directive, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, new or substantially changed installations and, on the other hand, existing installations. For the former category, all provisions of the Directive apply since October 1999. For the latter, Member States have until October 2007 to ensure compliance.

Core extraction activities are not covered by the IPPC Directive, but activities of the kind undertaken at the Baia Mare site are already inside the scope of the IPPC Directive. Indeed, paragraph 2.5 (b) of Annex I covers "installations for the production of non-ferrous crude metals from ore, concentrates or secondary raw materials by metallurgical, chemical or electrolytic processes".

However, the IPPC Directive may not cover all sites in the European Union where tailings dams are used. They could either not be production sites (if they are in isolation from the actual site of production), not be producing crude metals (if they produce for instance concentrates), or not be regarded as landfills falling under category 5.4 of Annex I. of the Directive ("landfills receiving more than 10 tonnes per day or with a total capacity exceeding 25 000 tonnes, excluding landfills of inert waste"). However, most of the dams probably meet these thresholds.

The concept of 'landfills' is not defined in the IPPC Directive, but the Landfill Directive (99/31/EC)¹⁴ provides for a definition. According to Article 2 (g) of that Directive, a landfill means a waste disposal site for the deposit of the waste onto or into land. Storage of waste prior to recovery or treatment for a period less than three years as a general rule and storage of waste prior to disposal for a period of less than one year are excluded from the definition of a landfill. It should be noted that the Baia Mare and Aznalcóllar tailing ponds were not destined for temporary storage. On the basis of the above definition, it is likely that a vast majority of tailings dams are indeed covered through the present wording of Annex I.

6. FOLLOW-UP -THE ACTION PLAN

The recent mining accidents have illustrated a need for a review of Community environmental policy. This is particularly important in view of the EU enlargement. Therefore, the actions described below will be prepared in close co-operation with the candidate countries.

Discussions with Member States' experts have started in view of changing the classification category of dangerous waste and including these wastes in the Hazardous Waste list. First conclusions are expected for the second half of 2000.

Furthermore, the Water Framework Directive, recently adopted upon by the Council and the European Parliament, calls for measures at watershed level including "measures required to prevent significant leakage of pollutants from technical installations, and reduce the impact of accidental pollution incidents", and "systems to detect or give warning of such events".

From a civil protection point of view, the experience from the Baia Mare accident in Romania also clearly demonstrates a need for improvement of the early warning systems. The Commission has therefore proposed to establish a Community Mechanism for the co-ordination of the Civil Protection Interventions in case of Emergencies 15 .

Moreover, the White Paper on environmental liability 16 contains proposals for the introduction of a Community environmental liability regime with the objective of improving the implementation of key environmental principles such as polluter-pays, prevention and precaution and of existing EU environmental laws, and also to ensure adequate restoration of the environment.

The Environment Council of Ministers of 30 March 2000 gave broad support to the proposal of the Commission to establish a framework Directive for this purpose. Such a proposal is under preparation and is meant to be presented before the end of 2001. Several studies need to be carried out beforehand, dealing with economic aspects such as competitiveness and insurability, and with valuation and restoration of damage to biodiversity, among other things. Account will also be taken of the opinions of the other European institutions and the comments of interested parties.

Apart from these activities, three key actions are envisaged. These would relate to industrial risk management, the management of mining waste and integrated pollution prevention and control.

6.1. Amendment of the Seveso II Directive

In terms of industrial risk management, the Seveso II Directive seems to be the most appropriate legislative tool to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances. The Directive obliges industrial operators to put into effect Safety Management Systems, including a detailed risk assessment on the basis of possible accident scenarios.

In order to do away with the ambiguities contained in the Directive and described above, it is envisaged to amend the Seveso II Directive to unequivocally include the mineral processing of ores and, in particular, tailings ponds or dams used in connection with such mineral processing of ores. It is important to note that any such activity would only be covered by the Directive if dangerous substances are involved and if they are present in quantities beyond the threshold levels set out in the Directive.

This amendment will be prepared following the completion of the report of the Baia Mare Task Force. It will be part of a wider review of the scope of the Directive.

The explosion of the storage facility at SE Fireworks in Enschede/Netherlands earlier this year which resulted in a large number of deaths and injured persons has, in any event, created the need to evaluate the qualifying quantities assigned to pyrotechnic substances and to make proposals for amendments to the Seveso II Directive.

Moreover, already on the occasion of the adoption of the Directive, the Commission had been asked by Council to evaluate the qualifying quantities assigned to substances dangerous for the environment and the list of carcinogens contained in Annex I. This work has been carried out in two Technical Working Groups that have delivered their final reports in April 2000. These reports suggest to significantly lower the qualifying quantities assigned to substances dangerous for the environment and to extend the list of carcinogens contained in Annex I of the Seveso II Directive.

6.2. An initiative on the management of mining waste

The management of waste from extractive and quarrying activities requires detailed investigation. Mining waste is among the largest waste streams in the Community. Some waste streams, in particular generated by the non-ferrous metal mining industry, contain large quantities of dangerous substances, such as heavy metals. Although all metals are naturally occurring substances and are an essential part of everyday life, they are elements and therefore persistent in the environment. They need to be controlled below levels that constitute environmental harm although their concentrations in the environment can vary greatly due to natural proximity of metaliferous deposits. Once brought to the surface through mining activities metals and metal compounds tend to become chemically more available and deserve specific attention to prevent pollution.

Therefore, a study was launched in September 1999 on the existing legislation and practices concerning the management of waste from the extractive industry. The study will concentrate on the environmental issues of the management of mining waste as well as on the best practices, which could prevent environmental damage during the waste management.

The study was extended to include the candidate countries in which important mining activities are carried out (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia). The whole study should be finalised before the end of 2000 and will concentrate on the management of tailing ponds containing non-ferrous metal minerals. An inventory of main mining activities should be carried out at regional basis, as far as information is available. Difficulties are expected in the collection of information. With the available budget and time constraint, a detailed hot spots inventory of all abandoned and existing mines in these countries can not be drawn up. In the longer term, a research project on the environmental impact of mining waste in the candidate countries will be carried out by the Joint Research Centre in collaboration with other services of the Commission and the European Environment Agency. This study will consist of an inventory of toxic mining waste sites, a comparison of mining waste legislation and an assessment of the environmental consequences of mining accidents.

On the basis of the results of the study, which will be discussed with all stakeholders concerned, it will be possible to consider the need to adopt an initiative, in particular a Proposal for a Directive specifically focussing on the management of mining waste, which would consider site-specificity as well as significant differences between various sub-sectors of the extractive industry. This exercise will take place in 2001.

6.3. A BAT reference document under the IPPC Directive

In order to assist the implementation of the IPPC Directive in the non-ferrous metals mining sector, the Commission considers to organise an exchange of information concerning the management of tailings dams with a view to producing a special BAT reference document (BREF) on this subject. This task could be part of the ongoing BAT information exchange between Member States and industry, which is co-ordinated by the European IPPC Bureau 17 of the Commission's Joint Research Centre. Work should start before the end of this year aiming at completion by the autumn of 2002. The BREF should deal with both techniques to reduce everyday pollution and techniques to prevent or mitigate accidents.

A BREF is not prescriptive in nature. It is intended merely as information for the guidance of the competent (national, regional or local) authorit ies responsible for issuing permits to installations that fall within the scope of the IPPC Directive. Apart from the authorities in the Member States of the European Union, there are several other interested target groups for a BREF, such as authorities in the candidate countries to the European Union, companies operating an IPPC installation in Europe, small and medium-sized companies within the relevant industry but not covered by the Directive, the scientific community, interested actors outside Europe, environmental organisations and, last but not least, the public at large.

A BAT reference document on the management of tailings dams would contribute to the knowledge about the measures that are available to prevent similar accidents in future. With this informat ion at their disposal, the licensing authorit ies would be in a position to require that, in the European Union, installations using tailings dams meet the highest environmental standards that can be found world-wide (provided that they meet the 'availability' criterion of Article 2(11) of the IPPC Directive).

As discussed earlier in this Communication (see section 5.5), the IPPC Directive may not cover all sites in the European Union where tailings dams are used. If necessary, the scope of the IPPC Directive could therefore be clarified to explicitly include metalliferous tailings dams with an inherent risk of significant damage to the environment or human health. In addition, the processing of certain mining minerals and residues could be included. Such amendments could be considered in the context of an initiative on the management of mining waste (see section 6.2).

6.4. Input to the Baia Mare Task Force

The three key actions identified as a focussed follow-up to recent mining accidents, i. e.

- an amendment of the Seveso II Directive

- an initiative on the management of mining waste

- a BAT reference document under the IPPC Directive will constitute an important input to the ongoing work of the Baia Task Force.

Footnotes:

1 COM(2000) 265 final, 3.5.2000.

2 Cyanide spill at Baia Mare Romania, UNEP/OCHA assessment mission, March 2000.

3 A number of factual elements have been taken from World Wildlife Fund, Analysis and evaluation of the clean-up activities of the toxic spill in Guadiamar river (1998).

4 OJ L 175 of 5 July 1985.

5 OJ L 73 of 14 March 1997.

6 OJ C 104 of 24 April 1992.

7 OJ L 129 of 18. May 1976, p. 23.

8 OJ L 10 of 14 January 1997, p. 13.

9 OJ L 326 of 3 December 1998, p. 1.

10 OJ L 194 of 25 July 1975, p. 39.

11 OJ L 78 of 26 March 1991.

12 OJ L 182 of 16 July 1999, p. 1.

13 OJ L 257 of 10 October 1996.

14 OJ L 182 of 16 July 1999.

15 COM(2000) 593 final.

16 COM(2000) 66 final, 9.2.2000.

17 http://eippcb.jrc.es.

December 2000
FOREWORD

This Report constitutes the response of the International Task Force for Assessing the Baia Mare Accident (the Baia Mare Task Force or 'BMTF') to the tasks given to us by Commissioner Margot Wallström, with the support of the Environment Ministers of Hungary and Romania, concerning the accidents which occurred at Baia Mare and Baia Borsa in Romania, in January and March 2000. These tasks were to consider:

• What happened, and why?
• What damage was caused?
• What other dangerous sites remain in the Tisa river basin system?
• What measures are recommended to minimise the risk of similar accidents?

We have tried to write the Report in a clear and succinct manner, in the hope that it will be easily accessible to those people affected by the accidents; from the outset the Commissioner asked the BMTF to ensure communication and dialogue with the people and the non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The BMTF has travelled extensively throughout the affected areas in the Tisa river basin (the pollution had been largely diluted by the time that it reached the Danube River), and visited each of the accident sites.

We held intensive consultations with private citizens, local and regional officials, NGOs, and other professional associations along the course of the river through Romania, Hungary and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from Baia Borsa and Baia Mare to Belgrade. Each of the three governments made available to us the results of their official investigations into the accidents and their impacts.

We were fortunate at an early stage to have access to the very valuable rapid assessments carried out by the UNEP/OCHA team in February and March 2000, led by Frits Schlingemann. We also had access to the results of studies undertaken by German and Dutch agencies and the WWF, and we commissioned a number of independent studies and investigations to assist us in addressing specific regulatory, engineering and environmental issues.

These were disastrous accidents which under different circumstances could have had more serious consequences. In the event, nobody died or became seriously ill despite the fact that 120 tonnes of cyanide and 20,000 tonnes of sediments containing heavy metals were released into the environment from the accidents. The impact might have been far more serious if the rivers had not been covered by ice for up to 200 km downstream of Baia Mare. Or, had the most severe floods for well over 100 years not occurred days after the second accident, with the result that heavy metals were washed away and dispersed, bringing heavy metal levels within the river system and on the flood plain back to levels which do not pose an immediate threat to health.

This must not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact that in many other locations in this region, and elsewhere in Europe, there are similar sites, both in active operation and abandoned, which pose the threat of similar accidents - the next time we may not be so lucky.

In our view, these accidents should act as the trigger for an urgent and thorough investigation of such sites. This should involve the preparation of an inventory, based on an agreed risk assessment methodology, so that all may be aware of the hazards and the need to minimise the risks posed. This is a task, the primary responsibility for which rests squarely on the shoulders of the countries themselves.

So far as the area of the Danube river basin is concerned, the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) should be the pro-active co-ordinating agency; but we strongly recommend that the European Commission takes the initiative to ensure adequate co-operation between all parties concerned. Such an inventory would serve as the basis for a programme of restoration and remediation. In addition, the relevant UN-ECE Conventions and Protocols should be quickly ratified by all UN-ECE member countries and the European Union.

We make a series of recommendations for the strengthening of existing regulations including emergency planning requirements, and for the addition of new regulations. In particular, we recommend that no new TMFs, where cyanide is used, should be based on the storage of water/slurry containing cyanide in tailings ponds open to the elements.

We feel that there is a clear need for a central Industry Guidance Document, which sets out and clarifies the many different regulatory requirements relating to the mining, extractive and ore-processing industries which are contained in a wide range of EU and national legislation - for EU countries and those countries seeking to become members of the EU, this task should be undertaken by the European Commission. Such a document would make it easier for both the industry and the public to be aware of the obligations of the industry regarding environmental protection, public safety and emergency planning. Our recommendations concentrate on what should, in our view, be done and not on how or at what level it should be done. In this context, the recent European Commission proposals are consistent with our recommendations.

Finally, we draw attention to the recent adoption of the EU Water Framework Directive, which calls for day-to-day protection of the Europe Union's water resources to be carried out by river basin authorities. The monitoring of water quality and water quantity for water resources management will require that river basin authorities develop the necessary skills, resources and flexibility to undertake these tasks. In the case of the Danube river basin, the ICPDR will be expected to play a vital role in facilitating the co-ordination of monitoring and early warning arrangements, and will need greater funding from its member countries, and an enhanced capacity to take swift action where necessary.

A great number of people and organisations have assisted us with our inquiries. The European Commission provided both the initial impetus to establish the BMTF and also provided the resources without which we would have been unable to undertake our inquiries. The governments of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provided us with their full support. Crucially, we received invaluable assistance from many local and municipal authorities and from non-governmental organisations. Without their input, our findings would be far less relevant. At an international level, the Dutch and Danish governments both provided the financial support for public communications initiatives proposed by the BMTF and we have also been greatly assisted by informal advice from the Irish and United States environmental protection agencies. On a technical level, we have received advice on regulatory and tailings pond management from a number of leading experts from Romania, Hungary and Germany. To all of these people, and the many others who have assisted us, we give our sincere thanks for helping us to complete our tasks.

The Baia Mare Task Force

(signed)

Tom Garvey, Chairman
Kaj Barlund
Liliana Mara
Emil Marinov
Kalman Morvay
Jean-François Verstrynge
Philip Weller

1. WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY

1.1 OVERVIEW

On the evening of 30 January 2000, a tailings pond burst at a facility near the city of Baia Mare, Romania which was reprocessing old mining tailings and re-depositing the waste sludge into a new tailings pond. This led to approximately 100,000 m 3 of waste water containing up to 120 tonnes of cyanide and heavy metals being released into the Lapus River, then travelling downstream into the Somes and Tisa rivers into Hungary before entering the Danube.

On 10 March 2000, another tailings dam burst in Baia Borsa in the same region close to the Ukrainian border. While some of this material was retained within the dam complex, 20,000 tonnes of sediments were then released into the Novat River, a tributary of the Viseu and Tisa rivers.

This section attempts to provide a brief account of what happened, and why, at the two sites concerned. While the BMTF was initially established to investigate the Baia Mare accident, its remit was subsequently enlarged to cover the Baia Borsa accident as well.

The first accident occurred near the city of Baia Mare at a tailings pond operated by AURUL, a joint-venture between Esmeralda Exploration of Australia and REMIN the Romanian state-owned mining company. AURUL had been established to re-process the tailings of an old abandoned tailings pond, extracting gold and silver and other metals and, at the same time, removing the tailings from their existing site close to a residential area to a more remote site 8km from the city of Baia Mare.

The facility had been designed as a 'zero discharge' process, with no emissions of process water to local rivers. The dust blown from old tailings ponds contains traces of heavy metals which can cause adverse health effects, so removal of the material provided an environmental health benefit to the town, while also providing an economic benefit to the town in terms of employment by AURUL. Consequently, the facility appeared to offer the prospect of a 'win-win' situation, with both environmental and economic benefits. In line with the design of the process, the tailings pond received process water containing high levels of cyanide, which is used in the gold extraction process. The process water was then recycled to the plant, thus reducing the amount of new cyanide that had to be added into the process and reducing the operating costs of the facility.

Source: UNEP/OCHA

The sequence of events leading to the accident was as follows:

• Throughout 1999, the tailings dam was developing as intended, with the hydrocyclones¹ building the embankment walls higher as re-mined tailings and waste process water were pumped into the tailings pond.
  
  
• Over the course of the winter of 1999, a significant amount of rain and snow fell on the tailings pond, and the pond became covered in a thick layer of snow and ice.
  
  
• Heavy (but not exceptional) rain and snowfall in December 1999 and January 2000, combined with rapid snowmelt from 27 January 2000 as the temperature rose suddenly from below freezing to 9.5ºC, and nearly 40mm of rainfall on 30 January 2000 caused water levels to reach critical levels. The embankment walls became saturated and unstable as the snow melted directly on their surfaces.
  
  
• On 30 January, the dam overflowed and washed away a stretch of embankment wall 25 metres long and 2.5 metres deep. Approximately, 100,000m 3 of tailings water containing cyanide began to flow into the nearby Lapus River. AURUL stopped processing operations and began activities to close the breach.

The second accident occurred at the Novat tailings management facility (TMF) at Baia Borsa, belonging to the state-owned mining company REMIN SA. In addition to the primary dam, a second and third dam had been constructed downstream from the primary dam. The second dam was designed to support the primary dam structure as it reaches its final height. The third dam was built of concrete and was designed to collect water that leaked from the first two dams for re-pumping to the main pond.

The dam overflowed and burst on 10 March 2000. 100,000 m 3 of water and 20,000 tonnes of tailings sludge containing heavy metals flowed out of the dam. While some material was retained between the two lower dams, the rest flowed downstream of the dam and into the Novat and Vasar rivers, from where it entered the Viseu and finally the Tisa river. Due to the downstream area from the dam being a specially protected nature area, no emergency discharge of water is permitted from the dam. As a result, the dam system is a closed-cycle design with no discharge downstream of the third dam.

The process was designed as a partially closed-circuit system, with process waters discharged into the pond being recycled through the metal extraction facility. In addition, the pond also receives direct rainfall and indirect surface run-off from the surrounding hill-slopes. Evaporation and the recirculating of water back to the main mine complex was supposed to ensure that water levels in the pond were controlled, with the main stream in the valley bypassing the pond. The pond complex, however, contained no provisions for emergency discharges downstream of the pond. As a result, if water levels reached critical levels, there was no way that water levels could be reduced.

Over the winter of 1999-2000, heavy rainfall and rapid snowmelt caused the water level in the pond to reach critical levels and for the dam walls to become unstable. As the pumps designed to pump water out of the pond, back to the processing plant and into other ponds were not working, it was impossible to avoid the overflow and breaching of the dam wall.

The sequence of events leading to the accident was as follows:

• In early December, heavy rain fell into the reservoir and surrounding catchment;
• From mid-December 1999 to late January 2000, more than 120mm of precipitation as snow fell on the reservoir and surrounding catchment;
• Temperatures fell below 0°C from 21 December 1999 and were below -10°C from 22 January 2000;
• On 27 January 2000, the temperature began to increase rapidly, rising above 0°C on 30 January;
• On 8-10 March 2000, torrential rainfall and rapid snowmelt led to increasing water levels in the reservoir, and the pumping systems for the pond failed;
• On 10 March at 11-00am a breach 25m wide and 10m high occurred in the dam, leading to the spillage of 20,000 tonnes of tailings into the Novat river;
• The tailings overflowed the second and third dams to enter into the river system, flowing along the Ukrainian border, before flowing into Hungary.

The reasons why the accidents happened are both clear, and a matter of general agreement and are discussed below.

1.4.1 The use of closed circuit systems

Both the AURUL and Novat tailings management facilities (TMFs) were based on closed circuit systems designed specifically to avoid the need to discharge effluents into local rivers and streams. All the process waters (including in the Baia Mare case waters with high concentrations of cyanide), were re-circulated back to the processing plant for re-use. While in principle this was a worthy objective, both in environmental and economic terms, the design in each case contained no provision for the emergency discharge of excess waters when overflow threatened. Without specific provision for avoiding overflows, such 'zero-discharge' systems are not suitable, in our view, for use in meteorological conditions of heavy and intense precipitation, such as those prevailing in this part of Romania, and should never have been condoned by the permitting authorities. The result was that, in each case, during severe weather conditions the additional volume of rain and melting snow could not be contained within the ponds, causing them to overflow.

1.4.2 Construction

Furthermore there was a problem in the case of Baia Mare with the stability of the embankment walls themselves. This arose because the Baia Mare facility used a recognised technique of embankment or dam wall construction (called 'construction by operation') which called for the gradual deposition of tailings of sufficiently coarse grade on the starter walls to ensure stable and continuous growth of the height of the embankment walls.

However, the mix of tailings used did not have the ratio of coarse to fine grades stipulated in the design and, in addition, the hydrocyclones used to distribute the tailings within the pond could not operate in the very low temperatures experienced before the accident. As a result, the embankment wall construction was interrupted at a critical time, leading to a reduction in the 'freeboard', and consequently to wall breaching and overflow.

In the case of Baia Borsa, the TMF was designed for a capacity of 2 million m³ of slurry, whereas only 400,000 m³ of slurry was actually deposited. As a result, the material available for dam construction was less than anticipated, leading to a lower dam wall then specified.

1.4.3 Monitoring

The monitoring of the water level of both ponds was by simple visual monitoring, difficult during times when the ponds are covered by an ice and snow cap. For Baia Mare, this form of monitoring was in conformity with the risk classification allotted to the pond by the operator, and accepted by the permitting authorities. In the case of Baia Borsa, while the monitoring procedures gave advance notice of the impending danger, it was not possible to reduce the level of the pond, and avert the accident, due to defective pumping equipment. In these circumstances it should have been clear that a combination of melting snow and ice cap, due to rapidly rising temperatures, accompanied by heavy and continuous precipitation could have had only one result. And this is exactly what happened during the period leading up to the accident, when heavy rain was accompanied by a rapid rise in temperature from -13° C to +9°C, thus adding the snow/ice melt to the on-going rainfall. Our investigations have established that such conditions while severe, were by no means unprecedented, and therefore should have been foreseen.

1.4.4 Regulatory oversight

Apart from the design and operational factors, we have grave reservations over the adequacy of the permitting procedures existing when the projects were planned and constructed. It is apparent that no adequate appreciation of the likely variability in 'water balance' (the difference between the volume of water entering the system, and the volume of water exiting the system by evaporation) was brought to bear. The initial Environmental Impact Study carried out by ICIM² on the AURUL project, stated that 'the danger of the dam overflowing the embankment...in the event of heavy rainfalls is out of the question'.

From then on, after the entry into force of the Romanian law on Environmental Protection (No.137/95), and during the six years it took to obtain all of the necessary permits, there was a failure to perceive the inherent dangers of approving such closed circuit systems, with no provision for emergency discharge. It was difficult for the BMTF, during its meetings with all of the authorities involved in the permitting process, to discern where exactly the responsibility for the overall safety of the facility lay. The regulatory process is extremely complex and diffused and, in the view of the BMTF, needs urgent revision. The Romanian authorities have informed us that significant progress has already been made in this revision.

1.4.5 Conclusion

As a result, it is the conclusion of the BMTF that the accidents were caused:

• Firstly, by the use of an inappropriate design of the TMF;
• Secondly, by the acceptance of that design by the permitting authorities; and
• Thirdly, by inadequate monitoring and dam construction, operation and maintenance.

In summary, therefore, the reasons for the two accidents are as follows:

In effect, these were two accidents waiting to happen, waiting for the necessary trigger of adverse weather conditions which was bound to come sooner or later.

2. IMPACTS OF THE ACCIDENTS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The accident at Baia Mare led to the release of a toxic 'plume' of a cyanide/copper mixture into the Tisa river. This plume travelled down the length of the river, into the Danube river and then into the Black Sea by which time it had become significantly diluted. It devastated large number of plant and wildlife species in the river systems, but once the plume had passed, water quality and sediment quality started to return to normal. As the plume consisted of dissolved materials, there was little deposition of pollutants. As a result, once the plume had passed, effectively no cyanide remained in the river or river banks.

Source: Apele Romane

Source: Apele Romane

2.2.1 Short-term impacts

The most remarkable feature of the accidents was the fact that, as far as we are aware, no one was killed or became seriously ill as a result of the accidents.

Swift and concerted action by municipalities and water supply companies along the Tisa and Danube rivers ensured that none of the pollution entered into the public drinking water supply. High groundwater levels also helped to minimise the contamination of groundwaters by the accidents. Bottles and bags of drinking water were provided to local residents while the mains water supply was halted as the pollution plumes passed. There was local contamination of wells in Bozanta Mare, close to the accident site in Baia Mare, and these people were subsequently provided with bottled drinking water.

2.2.2 Long-term impacts

The long-term health impacts of the accidents are uncertain at this stage. They are unlikely to relate to cyanide, which has dispersed and does not bioaccumulate. Any impacts would relate to the heavy metals added into the sediments and soils of the Tisa ecosystem. All the evidence to date suggests that, as a result of the accidents, heavy metal levels have not been elevated significantly in the river system, except for immediately downstream of the Novat dam. This situation needs to be kept under constant surveillance. As a result, it is important that some means is found to control the heavy metal sediments deposited immediately downstream of the dam, to ensure that they do not contribute, in the future, to increased heavy metal levels further downstream.

2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

The data available to us on the environmental impacts of the accidents represent a preliminary assessment, and are the result of investigations conducted by VITUKI and evidence collected by WWF from a variety of sources. Investigations are ongoing in Hungary in the areas where the most significant damage occurred. Many experts take the view that one annual reproductive cycle may be an insufficient basis for reaching final conclusions as to the long-term impacts. We welcome this on-going monitoring of the ecological development and recovery of the river system.

2.3.1 Short-term impacts

The spill at Baia Mare led to immediate, and very severe, effects on plants and wildlife in the Tisa river. Due to the non-persistent nature of cyanide and the relatively natural condition of the upper Tisa river system, once the pollution plume had passed, the river ecosystem was able to begin the process of recovery.

Plankton
Plankton in the Somes and upper Tisa river in Hungary (closest to the accident) was completely killed, and in the middle and lower reaches of the Tisa between 30-60% of plankton were killed by the passage of the pollution plume. Within days of the spill materials passing, phytoplankton and zooplankton had begun to recover throughout the entire river system.

Current evidence indicates that the number and species composition for phytoplankton has substantially returned to normal over all the stretches of the river. A major factor which appears to have assisted the process of recovery, is the flooding which occurred in March, and presented ideal conditions for plankton growth.

Molluscs and benthic organisms
The current available data indicates that considerable mortality occurred among molluscs and other benthic organisms in the upper reaches of the Somes. It is probable, that some species may have already been reduced in numbers in this region, through pollution that has occurred over many years. In the middle and lower stretches of the Tisa river (Hungary and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) the benthic organisms appeared to survive the cyanide spill although there is evidence that many species populations were reduced as a result of the pollution.

Of great symbolic significance as an indicator of ecosystem conditions has been the survival of the 'Tisa Flower' (Palingenia longicauda), a mayfly which hatched in large numbers this past summer throughout much of the Tisa River system. The conditions for hatching were apparently ideal following the spring floods. The fact that the cyanide appears to have been concentrated in the main channel of the river meant that the larvae survived and were able to hatch. Monitoring over the next 2-3 years will be required to confirm the recovery of the Tisa Flower, to reflect its breeding cycle.

In general it appears that the populations of macroinvertebrates were damaged from spill but not completely eliminated as originally feared. Recovery of the diversity of species and numbers has progressed rapidly during the first growing season following the spill.

Fish
The visible death of fish was a clear indication of the immediate impact of the accident at Baia Mare. Hungarian authorities report a total of 1240 tonnes of fish that were killed as a result of the spill. Of this amount 33.8% were predatory fish, 13.5% Carp, 8.1% Sturgeon, and 44.6% herbivorous fish. The fish collected included nearly all the fish known to be present in the river. It is clear, however, that not all fish were affected equally. The herbivorous fish, the Silver carp (Hypophthalichthys molitrix), in particular seemed to be very vulnerable to the cyanide and made up a large percentage of the fish that died.

Of significance is the possibility that some native, protected and endangered species may have been finally eliminated by the spill. In this category are Huso huso (Danube Salmon) and Acipenser güldenstaaedti (a highly protected Sturgeon species) which before the spill may have survived in the Tisa, although only in very small numbers. In addition, three other species (Stizostedion lucoperca, Stizostedion volgense and Lota lota) were almost completely eliminated.

Investigations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia indicate that the general fish population does not seem to have been significantly adversely affected by the spill. Some dead and dying fish were recovered in the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, but four species of fish examined in detail in a study prepared for WWF showed no major population alterations, with the exception of Zander.

There are no reports or evidence that fish in the Danube died as a result of the cyanide poisoning.

One of the important questions that emerged following the accident was why were not more dead and dying fish observed near Baia Mare and on the Somes river system in Romania. The explanation appears to lie in the fact that the ice cover prevented dead and dying fish from being seen and these were then washed downstream to Hungary where they were collected. In addition it seems that previous pollution of this section of the river had reduced the numbers and diversity of fish there. The ice cover also presented conditions ideal for compounding the effects of cyanide because in the ice covered stretches, the oxygen of the river would have been reduced. This deadly combination would have been most significant in the upper Tisa river section of Hungary.

Birds & Mammals
Immediate observations indicate that the effects of the pollution on birds and mammals were limited. The ability of mammals and birds to sense the presence of the cyanide and the ice cover over much of the river likely prevented large contact with the pollution.

There was direct evidences that two White Tailed Eagles were poisoned by the cyanide. The longer term effects on birds however would likely be more significant in relation to reduced breeding success resulting from loss of food supply. The initial evidence from Hungary and Romania, however, is that no detectable signs of population loss can be determined to date amongst species considered most sensitive.

Studies of species presumed to be sensitive to the loss of their food base through the spill including Cormorants, Storks, White-tailed Eagle, Bank Swallows, and Kingfishers in both Hungary and Yugoslavia found little evidence that major population loss has occurred. These species have found sufficient food from alternative sources - fish ponds not affected by the spill.

At the top of the food chain of a river system are otters. Evidence indicates that the population of otters was reduced significantly in the period of the spill either through death or moving to other areas and that in the months following the spill the situation has improved. Recently in some places under Tokaj the otters have already returned to their regular habitats. The process is hopefully going on toward the upper stretches of the rivers, but it is to early to summarise the effects on the population.

Studies of bats also found that despite the presumed reduction of numbers because of reduced food supply the population may have increased this past summer. One explanation seems to be that the reduced pressure of fish on the insect population may have made more food available for the bats.

2.3.2 Medium to long-term impacts

The spill at Baia Borsa posed the greatest risk of medium-term impacts. Heavy metals persist in the environment and 'bioaccumulate' in living organisms. As a result, even relatively low concentrations can pose a threat to ecosystems and human health over the medium to long-term. Immediately after the heavy metal plume had passed through the river systems, heavy metal concentrations were above limit values in the river sediments. This situation was generally improved several weeks later, when severe flooding re-mobilised and dispersing heavy metals, bringing concentrations to below limit values. Nevertheless, this still represents an incremental increase in heavy metal levels, no matter how difficult to quantify. If heavy metal levels are assumed to be increasing over time, then any additional input of heavy metals over the 'base load' must be seen as a serious issue.

It appears that the majority of the heavy metals contained within the sediments from Baia Borsa have remained within 6-10km downstream of the Novat dam. Over time, they can be expected to migrate slowly downstream during flood events and become dispersed throughout the river system. This residual threat of heavy metal contamination needs to be the subject of ongoing monitoring and research.

Footnotes:

¹ Hydrocyclones are devices used to separate fine sediments and water from coarse-grained sediments. The fines and water are deposited in the centre of the tailings pond while the coarser sediments are deposited on the dam wall, building up the embankment walls.

² ICIM: National Research and Development Institute for Environmental Protection.

At 20h00 yesterday, Hungary has activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism for urgent assistance in the response to the flood situation. The Hungarian authorities have identified an immediate need for up to 2 million sandbags to strengthen its flood containment capacity. Since 15 May, the country has put in place temporary flood protection measures along 930 km of river banks. With over 3.6 million sandbags already in use as temporary protection, Hungary is facing shortages. As the flood situation is worsening, the country urgently needs to strengthen its flood containment capacity and put in place additional temporary protection.

The country has been facing unusual amounts of rain since 15 May 2010, which has affected approximately one third of the country. The flood protection efforts are concentrated in four areas: North Hungarian rivers, Central Hungarian Great Plain, Valley of the Kapos rive, and the Bakony Mountains in Trans-Danubia. The request for 2 million sandbags has been sent to all civil protection authorities of the 31 countries participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

Background

The European Civil Protection Mechanism facilitates cooperation in disaster response. 31 states participate in the Mechanism (EU-27 plus Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). They pool those resources that can be made available to disaster-stricken countries all over the world through the Mechanism. When activated, the Mechanism ensures the coordination of assistance interventions inside and outside the European Union. Such activities are coordinated by the European Commission through the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Since its creation in 2001, the Mechanism has been activated for disasters in Member States (like the forest fires in Southern Europe in 2009) but also worldwide, including recent earthquakes in Haiti and Chile.

For More info on Commission's humanitarian aid:

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm

As a response to the Hungarian activation of the EU Civil protection mechanism, Germany has offered yesterday this afternoon 1 270 010 sand bags to increase its flood containment capacity of the country. The Czech Republic has offered 100 000 additional sand bags, the same amount offered by the Netherlands and Croatia Austria has offered 250 000 and last but not least, Denmark also offered 300.000 additional bags. The combined offers of these five countries(2.12 Million bags) go beyond the to 2 million sand bags that Hungary requested on 25 May when it activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. At this point in time, the Hungarian authorities have already accepted the offer of the Netherlands and are considering the others.

Since 15 May, the country has put in place temporary flood protection measures along 930 km of river banks. With over 3.6 million sandbags already in use as temporary protection, Hungary is facing shortages. As the flood situation is worsening, the country urgently needs to strengthen its flood containment capacity and put in place additional temporary protection.

The country has been facing unusual amounts of rain since 15 May 2010, which has affected approximately one third of the country. The flood protection efforts are concentrated in four areas: North Hungarian rivers, Central Hungarian Great Plain, Valley of the Kapos river, and the Bakony Mountains in Trans-Danubia. The request for 2 million sandbags has been sent to all civil protection authorities of the 31 countries participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

Background

The European Civil Protection Mechanism facilitates cooperation in disaster response. 31 states participate in the Mechanism (EU-27 plus Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). They pool those resources that can be made available to disaster-stricken countries all over the world through the Mechanism. When activated, the Mechanism ensures the coordination of assistance interventions inside and outside the European Union. Such activities are coordinated by the European Commission through the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Since its creation in 2001, the Mechanism has been activated for disasters in Member States (like the forest fires in Southern Europe in 2009, or recent floods in Poland) but also worldwide, including recent earthquakes in Haiti and Chile.

For More info on Commission's humanitarian aid:

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm

Institutions - 06-10-2010 - 15:46

Plenary sessions

At the opening of today's plenary session in Brussels, Parliament's President Jerzy Buzek made reference to Monday's flood of toxic waste in Hungary, the anniversary of the murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the EP's support for abolition of the death penalty.

Mr Buzek first expressed the EP's sympathy to the Hungarian people following Monday's release of toxic waste following a dam burst, which caused four deaths and over 300 injuries. He described it as "one of the worst disasters in the history of their country" and said "the European Parliament offers its full support and solidarity to Hungary in this difficult time."

He then paid tribute to Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who was assassinated four years ago tomorrow, as well as to other Russian activists, and urged the Russian authorities to do their best to enforce the rule of law.

Lastly, looking ahead to World Day against the Death Penalty on 10 October, the President reiterated Parliament's call for a moratorium on executions, saying "death can never be regarded as a form of justice". The EP, he said, was glad to see progress in Russia, Burundi and Togo but regretted the situation in Japan and the USA and was particularly concerned at the number of executions in China and Iran.

Agenda changes

A number of changes to the plenary agenda were approved. Today, Wednesday, a debate - with Council and Commission statements - on the social provisions of the Lisbon Treaty was added to the agenda, to be taken after the joint debate on the oral questions on biodiversity. The debate on the oral question on "Containers lost at sea and compensation" was removed from the agenda. On Thursday, the votes will begin at 11.30am instead of 11.00 and the report by Vladimír MANKA (S&D, SK) on the draft amending budget no. 2/2010 - part 2 (BUDG) was taken off the agenda.

REF. : 20101006IPR85229

Contact
Jack BLACKWELL
(+32) 2 28 42929 (BXL)
Mobile number : (+32) 498 98 34 00
E-mail address : press-en@europarl.europa.eu

(extract)

Executive summary

This extended report aims to provide a broad overview of the epidemiology and virology of the 2009 pandemic in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries (27 EU Member States (MS) and Norway and Iceland). Relevant background information on influenza epidemics and pandemics, notably their variability and unpredictability, is provided. The main trends and information are derived from the analysis and interpretation of the epidemiological and virological data and other analyses provided to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control's (ECDC) European Surveillance system (TESSy) through the European Influenza Surveillance Network (EISN).

These data and analyses show that, following its emergence in North America, the pandemic virus started to be transmitted in Europe around week 16/2009. This virus met the previously determined criteria for a pandemic in Europe as it did elsewhere. Surveillance suitable for the pandemic was rapidly developed and agreed upon by ECDC and the EU/EEA MS, with input from the World Health Organization (WHO) and countries already affected from outside Europe. This built on pre-existing systems, but included new elements to monitor the situation among those severely affected by the pandemic virus. In addition, epidemic intelligence and targeted science-watch methods were employed to determine, as early as possible, important parameters needed for informed risk assessments, adjusting projections and informing counter-measures.

The European Influenza Surveillance Network reported an initial spring/summer wave of transmission that appeared in most countries, but was only striking in a few countries, especially the United Kingdom. The rate of transmission briefly subsided as the summer progressed, but then accelerated again in the early autumn just after the re-opening of schools. This time it affected all countries, as an autumn/winter wave was seen to progress from west to east across the continent. The World Health Organization officially declared the pandemic over in week 32 of 2010.

In most countries, the autumn/winter wave of infection was sharp in shape, lasting approximately 14 weeks and was accompanied by a similar wave of hospitalisations and deaths. However, there was heterogeneity in the severity of disease as it varied from place to place, even within countries. In all, 2900 official deaths were reported by EU/EEA countries in the first 12 months during which the MS made extra efforts to collect these data. However, is recognised this will be only a proportion of the true burden of deaths due to the pandemic. An excess of allcause deaths in school-aged children was detected. Though this was an influenza virus never seen previously, prior exposure to a presumably antigenically similar influenza virus circulating before the mid-1950s ensured that many older people in Europe had some prior immunity. This fact, not unique to the 2009 pandemic, explains two of its notable differences from interpandemic, or seasonal, influenza: the overall lower mortality and the higher than expected relative burden of illness and fatality rates in young people. Though many older people appeared to be protected, those that were not showed the highest case fatality rates of any age group.

The pandemic virus displaced the previously dominant interpandemic influenza A viruses in Europe; though influenza B viruses still appeared at a low level late in the season. Only a low number of pandemic viruses were found to be resistant to oseltamivir and of these, very few seemed to be capable of being transmitted from one human to another. Though the pandemic viruses are not identical, there is little evidence of significant drift or the emergence of dominant new variants to date. One variant-A(H1N1)-D222G-has been suggested to be associated with more severe disease, though causation has not been established.

Although anecdotal evidence suggests that there were more mild and asymptomatic cases in comparison to the interpandemic influenza, there were enough cases of acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS)-a condition very rarely seen with interpandemic influenza-to stress intensive-care services in many places. Young children experienced the highest rates of disease, and country reports reveal that the highest rates of infection were in school-aged children. These high rates of illness passed particular burdens onto primary services, hospital paediatric services and especially intensive-care units in some localities.

Some limited data from serological surveys are now becoming available and support the surveillance data indicating higher rates of transmission than suspected from the clinical signs. However, these are not yet sufficient to make reliable predictions concerning what will happen next winter (2010/2011), and for this purpose the experience of the Southern Hemisphere temperate countries in the European summer period of 2010 has been most revealing.

At an early stage, the pandemic was much less severe than what had been feared. This was highlighted in the early ECDC Risk Assessments*, WHO reports and briefings given by ECDC to national and European authorities. With low rates of absenteeism, there was also little impact on services outside of the health sector. This and other features meant that this was arguably the most benign pandemic for which Europe could have hoped.

Budget ? 31-03-2011 - 16:51

Committee: Budgets

Plans to release €182.4 million in EU Solidarity Fund aid to help repair the flood damage in Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia and Romania in 2010 were approved by the Budgets Committee on Thursday, despite MEPs' strong reservations about the funding method chosen by the Council. The direct cost of the damage is estimated at about €5.5 billion.

MEPs disapproved of the source of the funding, a "negative reserve", as proposed by the Council of Ministers, as a "once-only solution" but nonetheless voted for the Council proposal, because they felt that they could not let flood victims also become victims of a dispute between the Council and Parliament.

Background to the conflict

The Solidarity Fund contains no money as such. When natural disasters occur, aid funding must come from other budget lines, via a procedure called "redeployment". At the start of any given year, it is difficult to assess for which budget lines money might remain available at the end of the year. Budgets Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski therefore proposed that "fresh money" be added to the budget by means of an amending budget, a procedure agreed during last December's budget negotiations.

However, some Member States objected to the Commission proposal on the grounds that it would affect total payments for 2011 and mustered a qualified majority to change the Commission's proposal so as to use a so-called "negative reserve". In the committee's view, this procedure merely provides a "once-only" solution, since the maximum available for this reserve is €200 million. Moreover, it is considered contrary to an existing agreement on meeting unforeseen, urgent needs.

Payments versus commitments

In last year's budget negotiations, some Member States focused on payments. They disagreed with the Commission's estimates (5.8% increase) and managed to reduce the increase in payments for the 2011 budget to 2.91%. MEPs feared that this could prevent the Commission from being able to meet its payment obligations. By way of compromise, the Council signed a joint declaration, stating that in the event of unforeseen costs or emergencies, funds would be added by means of amending budgets.

MEPs felt that Thursday's decision is contrary to this declaration. Budgets Committee Chair Alain Lamassoure (EPP, FR), warned that this behaviour would make it hard to accept any further written declarations by Member States during the discussions over the 2012 budget and the 2014-2020 financial perspectives.

Mr Lamassoure also underlined that Member States should focus not on payments, but on commitments. "This was common practice until a few years ago. If you commit, you have to pay. I tried to make this point in yesterday's trilogue with the Commission and the Hungarian Presidency, but they reacted with mute, autistic silence. Payments are obligatory expenditure, a result of previous commitments. If we continue to focus on that, we get to an absurd, impossible situation", he warned.

In the chair: Alain Lamassoure (EPP, FR)

REF. : 20110331IPR16703

Half are Kosovars, Syrians or Afghans

During the first three months of 2015, 185 000 first time asylum seekers applied for protection in the European Union (EU), almost stable compared with the last quarter of 2014 but up by 86% compared with the first quarter of 2014. In particular, the number of Kosovars rose considerably to reach almost 50 000. They represent the main citizenship of first time asylum applicants in the EU over the first quarter 2015, ahead of Syrians and Afghans.

FRONTEX

2015-06-23

Since the beginning of the year some 153 000 migrants were detected at Europe’s external borders. This represents a 149% increase when compared to the same pe­riod in 2014 when 61 500 migrants entered Europe.

In May the total number of detections rose by 26% in relation to April and reached 50 500. Considering seasonal trends, it is expected that the migratory pressure will continue to increase during the summer period on all routes.

Compared to April, the largest increase was reported on the Western Balkan route (the Hungarian land border with Serbia) where in May the number of apprehended migrants exceeded 10 000. In the period between 1 January and 31 May 2015, over 50 000 migrants were detected on this route which constitutes an 880% increase com­pared to the same period in 2014.

The land route towards Hungary constitutes the main transit route for migrants who entered the EU from Greece and Bulgaria. This route is considered safer than other routes by migrants from Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries and the fares charged by people smugglers are lower.

Overall, in May, some 19 000 migrants used the Eastern Mediterranean route - a 32% increase since April. Since the beginning of the year, detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route have exceeded 48 000, which is almost five and a half times more than last year. This large increase, mostly due to the rise in the number of Syrian and Afghan migrants poses a significant challenge to the reception capacity in the Greek Aegean Islands.

The migratory situation in Central Mediterranean remains difficult. In May the numbers of detected migrants exceeded 20 500 - the highest monthly level this year and a 29% increase compared to April. In the period between 1 January to 31 May 2015, there were over 47 000 arrivals in Italy, a moderate increase (+14%) compared to the same period in 2014.

Most migrants arriving in Italy this year depart from Libya (over 42 000), but also to a much smaller extent from Egypt (1 740), Turkey (770), Greece (719) and Tunisia (256).

Compared to the first four months of 2014, detections in the Western Mediterranean have increased both on its land and sea borders: with 108% increase at Spain’s land borders between Morocco and Ceuta and Melilla (over 3 200) was reported at the sea route between Morocco and Algeria towards the Spanish Levante coast. The increasing trend is believed to be related to the summer season.

I. MIGRATION

1. Europe needs a balanced and geographically comprehensive approach to migration, based on solidarity and responsibility. Following the decisions taken by the European Council last April, concrete measures have been taken to prevent further loss of life at sea, to find new ways of confronting smugglers and to intensify cooperation with countries of origin and transit, while respecting the right to seek asylum. The launch of the EUNAVFOR MED mission, decided on 22 June by the Council, is an important contribution in this respect. Operational action to tackle the traffickers and smugglers in accordance with international law is an essential part of our comprehensive approach.

2. Further to the Commission's European Agenda on Migration, work should be taken forward on all dimensions of a comprehensive and systemic approach.

3. Wider efforts, including the reinforcement of the management of the Union’s external borders, are required to better contain the growing flows of illegal migration. Today, the European Council focused on three key dimensions which must be advanced in parallel: relocation/resettlement, return/readmission/reintegration and cooperation with countries of origin and transit. The Council will regularly assess progress in all three strands and report back later in the year.

I. Situational overview

Situation at the border

Border surveillance

Illegal border-crossings

During the analysed period, there were 27 646 nationals of the Western Balkans (Fig. 2) detected illegally crossing the regional and common green borders, which represents a 62% share of the overall IBC detections (regional and non-regional migrants).
The vast majority (over 99%) of the nationals from Western Balkan countries detected while attempting illegal bordercrossing were reported at the common borders with EU Member States, especially Hungary (90%) and Greece (9%).

At the southern borders of Greece, Albanians remained the most detected nationality, representing the well-known circular migration, while the northern section (the Hungarian border) was still targeted by a more diverse flow, mostly made up of Kosovo* citizens.

The remaining 38% of the overall detections at the regional green borders were mostly non-regional migrants (Fig. 3) in transit from Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria (mainly Afghan and Syrian nationals, representing 15% and 13%, respectively, of the total overall detections). The 16 367 non-regional migrants reported at the green borders represented a significant rise (+12%) compared to the previous quarter and a new quarterly record since the WB-RAN data collection began.

Overall, at regional level, in the analysed quarter detections of Afghans increased significantly (+16%) compared to the previous three months, which made them top detected non-regional nationality, ahead of Syrians, whose numbers decreased by 14% compared to the last quarter of 2014.

The detections of Iraqi, Pakistani and Somali migrants all tripled in comparison to the previous quarter, marking the most notable increases in the analysed period. Furthermore, although they registered lower overall totals, the share of Bangladeshi and Iranians also significantly increased during the first quarter.

In the month of July, the number of migrants detected at EU’s borders more than tripled to 107 500 compared to the same month of last year, surpassing the 100 000 mark in a single month for the first time since Frontex began keeping records in 2008.

The figure was the third consecutive monthly record, jumping well past the previous high of more than 70,000 reached in June. Both the Eastern Mediterranean route and the Western Balkans were also well above the previous month’s highs.

This brings the number of detections in the January-July period to nearly 340 000, compared to 123 500 recorded in the same period of last year and 280 000 in all of 2014. This has created an unprecedented pressure on border control authorities in Greece, Italy and Hungary.

Syrians and Afghans accounted for a lion’s share of the record number of migrants entering the EU illegally. Most of them, fleeing instability in their home countries, initially entered Greece from Turkey.

“This is an emergency situation for Europe that requires all EU member states to step in to support the national authorities who are taking on a massive number of migrants at its borders,” said Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri.

“Frontex has called on member states to provide additional equipment and people to support our operations in Greece and in Hungary and the European Commission has approved national programmes to provide significant financial assistance to the Member States to address these challenges,” he added.

In July, the most detections were reported in the Aegean Sea (nearly 50 000), mainly on the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Kos.

Italy detected more than 20 000 migrants last month, bringing the total number to 90 000 so far in 2015. Nine out of every ten migrants taking the perilous journey from Libya to Italy come from Africa, mainly Eritrea and Nigeria.

In the Western Balkans, the Hungarian authorities reported more than 34,800 detections.

More than 500 000 migrants were detected at EU external borders in the first eight months of this year after a fifth consecutive monthly record was registered in August when 156 000 crossed the EU borders.

However, a large number of the persons detected at the Hungarian border with Serbia had already been counted when they arrived in Greece from Turkey a few weeks earlier.

By comparison, in the entire 2014, there were 280 000 detections at EU borders.

The Greek islands again saw the biggest number of detections in August at 88 000, an 11-fold rise compared to the same month last year. Nearly three-quarters of the people arriving from Turkey were Syrians.

“The Greek islands continue to be under an intense migratory pressure. Just last week Frontex offered additional staff to help identify and register the new arrivals on Lesbos and Kos, which have been particularly affected,” said Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri.

The migrants arriving from Turkey speak about increasingly aggressive and cruel smugglers, who ignore worsening weather conditions and force migrants on overcrowded rubber boats to squeeze a bigger profit out of every trip.

A large number of the migrants arriving in Greece make their way towards Hungary, where the number of detections at its border with Serbia increased 20-fold to more than 52 000 in August, bringing the number so far this year to more than 155 000.

Italy detected nearly 13 000 migrants in the month of August, nearly half the number from the same month of last year. These were mainly people from Eritrea and a number of Sub-Saharan countries who arrived from Libya, although an increasing number of them departed Turkey.

Since the beginning of the year, 106 000 migrants were rescued in the Central Mediterranean, 6 percent fewer than in the same period of last year. It is important to note that most of the rescues took place closer to the Libyan coast than to the EU sea borders.

European Commission - Statement

Today we have taken a first step forward as a Union on the refugee crisis. However, this is only the beginning and more must be done to cope with the enormous challenges Europe and its citizens are facing at the moment.

Interior Ministers meeting for an Extraordinary Council today offered their support for the comprehensive agenda the Commission put forth in May and September to address the refugee crisis.
Member States have agreed to express their solidarity with one another by deciding to relocate throughout the EU 40,000 refugees, based on the European Commission's first emergency relocation proposal of 27 May. An operational meeting will be organised this week to start implementing the relocation decision on the 40,000 in the shortest possible timeframe.

The European Commission also appreciates the willingness of the majority of Member States to move forward as soon as possible towards an agreement on relocating another 120,000 people in clear need of international protection, as proposed by the European Commission on 9 September.

We welcome the Council's decision to significantly and immediately increase the EU's financial support to Syria and its neighbouring countries. There is no solution to the refugee crisis without dealing with its root causes.

Solidarity must also go hand in hand with responsibility. We welcome therefore the commitment to reach an agreement on the Safe Countries of Origin list in October and on the immediate and continued rolling out of the Hotspot approach in the Member States most directly concerned. The Commission will play its role in ensuring their proper implementation on the ground.

The European Union can only function if everyone plays by the rules. The Schengen system and all its benefits can only be preserved if EU Member States work together swiftly, responsibly and with solidarity in managing the refugee crisis. We must keep the borders between EU Member States open, but at the same time we also need stronger joint efforts to secure our external borders.

We called for a strong effort in European solidarity when presenting the Commission’s proposals to the European Parliament on 9 September and when President Juncker spoke to Heads of State and Government over the past days. The Commission will continue to work in close cooperation with the European Parliament, the Council, the 28 EU Member States and Schengen Associated States. We need swift progress and the operational implementation of our joint decisions so that we can make a difference on the ground as soon as possible. We would like to thank the European Parliament in particular for their response last week to our first emergency relocation scheme which paved the way for the first refugees to be relocated from Italy and Greece without delay.

We now need to see the same sense of responsibility and urgency on the new emergency measures we proposed last week. More ambition is needed to respond to the magnitude of the challenge that Europe is facing. We need to come to a more fundamental change of the current system to better combine responsibility, solidarity and effective management within a truly European Asylum and Migration Policy.

The world is watching us. Now is the time for each and every one to take responsibility.

A third are from Syria or Afghanistan

During the second quarter of 2015 (from April to June 2015), 213 200 first time asylum seekers applied for protection in the European Union (EU), up by 15% compared with the first quarter of 2015 and by 85% compared with the second quarter of 2014. In particular, the number of Syrians and Afghans rose considerably to reach almost 44 000 and 27 000 respectively. They represent the two main citizenships of first time asylum applicants in the EU over the second quarter 2015, accounting for a third of all first time applicants. Kosovars, who were the top citizenship of first time asylum applicants in the first three months of 2015, have seen their number drop from almost 50 000 during the first quarter 2015 to just over 10 000 in the second quarter 2015.

More than 1 out of 3 applied for asylum in Germany

During the second quarter 2015, the highest number of first time applicants was registered in Germany (80 900 first time applicants, or 38% of total first time applicants in the EU), followed by Hungary (32 700, or 15%), Austria (17 400, or 8%), Italy (14 900, or 7%), France (14 700, or 7%) and Sweden (14 300, or 7%). Compared with the previous quarter, the number of first time asylum applicants in the second quarter 2015 notably jumped in the Netherlands (+159%), Latvia (+123%), Austria (+79%), Finland (+67%) and Denmark (+66%).

Highest number of first time applicants relative to the population in Hungary

Compared with the population of each Member State, the highest rates of registered first time applicants during the second quarter 2015 were recorded in Hungary (3 317 first time applicants per million inhabitants), ahead of Austria (2 026) Sweden (1 467) and Germany (997). In contrast, the lowest rates were observed in Slovakia (5 applicants per million inhabitants), Croatia (6), Romania (19), Slovenia (20), Lithuania (21), Portugal (24) and the Czech Republic (26). In the second quarter 2015, there were 420 first time asylum applicants per million inhabitants in the EU.

CONTENTS
Latest asylum trends and main countries of origin........................2
Five Years of EASO: Results and Perspectives................................4
EASO call for experts to assist in Italy and Greece.........................4
Kick-off meeting of the COI Specialist Network on the Ukraine....5
EASO publishes COI report on Pakistan.........................................5
Conference on Home Affairs Funds...............................................6
EASO reports to the European Parliament on the hotspots..........6
EASO Info point at the European Parliament.................................7
NPI - study visit to the UK Ministry of Home Affairs......................7
EASO Training Curriculum..............................................................8
Trainers’ Network Meeting............................................................8
Train-the-trainer Sessions..............................................................8
EASO Cooperation with courts and tribunals.................................8
Judicial Analysis on Exclusion.........................................................8
EASO judicial cooperation with Germany.......................................9
Judging on the Common European Asylum System.......................9
Vulnerable Groups.........................................................................9
Advanced workshop on EASO Practical Guide on Family Tracing..9
EASO notices (including vacancies)...............................................10

The total number of migrants who crossed the EU’s external borders in the first nine months of this year rose to more than 710 000 with the Greek islands on the Aegean continuing to be the most affected by the unprecedented inflow of people. This compares with 282 000 recorded in all of last year.

In the month of September, the number of detections at EU’s external borders stood at 170 000 last month compared to 190 000 recorded in August.

The Greek islands, especially Lesbos, continued to face a massive migratory pressure, with the number of detections in the January-September period reaching 350 000. In September, the number of people detected in the Eastern Mediterranean region was mostly flat at nearly 49 000. Syrian refugees remained the dominant nationality among the arriving migrants.

Due to an increasing shortage of boats in Libya and worsening weather conditions, the number of migrants arriving in Italy halved in the month of September to 12 000. This brought the figure for the first nine months of the year to nearly 129 000. Eritreans were the most numerous among the people using this route.

“Urgent assistance is needed, especially for Greece and Italy, to help register and identify the new arrivals. Earlier this month, I requested the EU countries to provide Frontex with additional border guards who can assist these two countries in dealing with such unprecedented flows. I do hope we receive adequate contributions which will show the true spirit of European solidarity,” said Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri.

The massive numbers of migrants coming to the Greek islands continue to have a direct knock-on effect on the Western Balkan route, where Hungary reported more than 204 000 detections at its borders - 13 times higher than in the same period of 2014. An estimated 97 000 people, not yet included in the official figures, also entered the EU through Croatia in the second half of September after Hungary sealed its border with Serbia.

Clarification: Frontex provides monthly data on the number of people detected at the external borders of the European Union. Irregular border crossings may be attempted by the same person several times in different locations at the external border. This means that a large number of the people who were counted when they arrived in Greece were again counted when entering the EU for the second time through Hungary or Croatia.